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FACULTY AND ALUMNI COMMENTS
STUDENT ELIGIBILITY FOR THE VIRGINIA BAR
EXAMINATION: AN OBSERVATION ON
THE RECENT AMENDMENT
ROBERT

R.

HUNTLEY, JR.*

A recent legislative change' in the eligibility requirements for
taking the Virginia Bar Examination has caused some consternation
among students and to an extent among their teachers in the law
schools of the State. The amendment has the effect of limiting to one
the number of times a person may normally attempt the examination
prior to graduation from law school-and obviously is for this reason
thoroughly disliked by law students. (Of possible interest to prospective employers of these students is the effect of the amendment upon
the likelihood that a student will have taken the examination at the
time when he is seeking a job.)
Formerly it was provided by statute that a person who had "studied
law for at least two years" at an approved law school was eligible to
take the examination. 2 Since the examination is given twice each year,
in June and December, students in usual course were thus permitted
to take it in June after the intermediate year and in December of the
senior year, as well as in June after graduation. The new enactment,
effective last January, provides- that prior, to graduation a student
may take the examination only if he has successfully completed two
years of study and, at the time of his application, 4 is regularly enrolled
in his third year. This provision prevents students from taking the
examination in June after the intermediate year.5
OAssociate Professor of Law, Washingtor and Lee University. .
"Va. Code Ann. § 54-62.1 (Supp. 196o),
'The prerequisites for licensing to practice have not been changed. In order to
be licensed, one must have completed his formal education either-in',an approved
law school or in the office of a practicing attorney in this State. Va. Code Ann. §
54-62 (Supp. 1960).
*Rules promulgated by the Board of Bar Examiners provide that the examination will be given in Richmond beginning on the second Monday in December
and in Roanoke beginning on the last MVfonday in June.
'Applications must be completed and filed on or before April 15, for the June
examination, and on or before October 15, for the December examination. Rule
17, Virginia Board of Bar Examiners.
5It will undoubtedly also be applied to eliminate students who at the time of
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From the viewpoint of the faculties of the law schools, one probable
result of the amendment will be a noticeable disruption of the third
year curriculum during the Fall semester. Heretofore, most students
interested in practicing in Virginia have taken the examination in
June after the intermediate year. Because the examination is given
late in the month of June, there was sufficient time after the dose of
the academic year to accommodate the usual pre-examination preparation and panic. Normally only a small group attempted the examination during the winter of.the senior year. However, under the amendment it seems inevitable that a majority of the seniors will want to take
it in December since that will be the first and only opportunity they
will have prior to graduation. This exodus in December, preceded
presumably by several weeks of intensive study, will almost certainly
have an unhappy consequence in its effect upon the teaching and study
of regular course work.
Perhaps ihe new requirement is premised on the assumption
that students regularly enrolled in the third year will be better
prepared to take the examination than they would have been at the
end of only two years of law study. However, it is doubtful to this
writer that a student who is in the midst of his fifth semester's work,
on which he is yet to be examined, will be significantly more learned
in the law than one who has just completed his fourth semester. As
has been noted, what is more likely is that a goodly portion of that
fifth semester will have been spent in "cramming" for and fretting over
the impending ordeal, to the neglect of regular course work.
Both the former system and the present one are vulnerable to
the argument that it is altogether illogical and impractical to examine
students on their qualifications to practice law at any time before
they have completed the formal education which is required of them.
The law school curriculum is presumably designed to familiarize the
student with legal concepts. and methods of reasoning and at the
making application have completed three full semesters and one summ session
(1/2 semester) and who are enrolled in their fourth full semester. Such students
probably will not be regarded as regularly enrolled in the third year at the time
of making application.
Two other changes of some interest have been made in the statutes relating
to the bar examination. Hereafter, one who fails the examination is limited to
four additional efforts to pass it. Va. Code Ann. § 54-66 (Supp. 1960). Hereafter, one
who has graduated from law school before making application to take the bar

will apparently have to satisfy a six-month residence requirement before his application will be accepted. Previously, a student who had graduated within three
months of making application could avoid this residence requirement.

Code Ann. § 54-60 (RepL Vol.

1958)

CL

with Va. Code Ann. § 54-6o (Supp. x96o).

Va.
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same time to leave him with something of a rounded view of the
law in proper perspective. To permit the student to subject himself to
an examination of crucial importance to him, which presumably
is designed to test him on a number of matters to which he has not
even been exposed, at a time when he still has a piecemeal view of the
law is to encourage in him a deplorably artificial and superficial approach. Incidentally, the adoption of a requirement that formal education be completed before taking the bar examination would obviously eliminate the interference with the curriculum which, as
noted above, will probably come about under the present statute.
It is possible that the recent amendment was intended as something of a compromise between the view favoring the former system
and the view favoring completion of educational requirements before
becoming eligible to take the bar examination. If so, it appears to
have been one of those unfortunate middle views which effectively
abandons the best features of both the positions intended to be
compromised.

DESERTION DURING PENDENCY OF DIVORCE SUIT
JOSEPH L. LYLE,JR.*

In the field of domestic relations, it is generally stated that a defendant in a divorce suit may, by cross-bill, assert a cause of action
for divorce which has accrued in his favor subsequent to the filing of
the complainant's original bill.' Thus a cross-bill is accorded the
same dignity as an original bill, and this dignity is not impaired by the
fact that the matter alleged therein did not occur until after the
original bill was filed. 2 Such a statement of the law is not surprising; it
*Associate, Hickson & Davies, Lynchburg, Virginia. B.A., 1958, Washington
and Lee University; LL.B., i96o, Washington and Lee University.
'Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Khn. 5o7, 44 Pac. i (896),
Martin v. Martin, 33 W Va.
695, 11 S.E. 12 (189o); White v. White, 167 Wis. 615, 168 N.W 704 (1918); 19 C.J.
Divorce § 305 (192o); 9 R.C.L. Divorce and Separation § 226 (1931).

"It is recognized and permissible practice for the defendant to file a cross-bill
and ask independent relief in divorce suits. When he does so, his suit is as separate
and distinct from that of his wife as if the wife had brought no suit, and the
finding of the court should be upon each separately." Sloeum v. Sloeum, 86 Ark. 469,
iii S.W 8o6 (igo8).
TPettigrew v. Pettigrew, 172 Ark. 647, 291 S.W 90 (1927); Wiess v. Wiess, 135

Misc. 264, 238 N.Y.S. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Roberts v. Roberts, 99 W. Va. 204, 128 S.E.
144 (1925); Heinemann v. Hememann, 202 Wis. 639, 233 N.W 552 (1930)

"If the final decree in a cause fixes the rights of the parties as of its date, it
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appears to be based on sound principles. The point in time at which
an offense occurred would appear to have little bearing on the merits
of a suit alleging such offense. It is interesting, however, to note that
this principle is rarely applied where the offense alleged in the crossbill is that of desertion or abandonment. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia, for example, has consistently held that as a
matter of law, physical separation occurring after one spouse files
a bill for divorce cannot constitute the offense of desertion.3 The most
recent occasion for such a decision was the case of Plattnerv. Plattner,4
in which the Virginia court was confronted with these facts:
On January 15, 1957 W filed a bill praying for a divorce a mensa
et thoro, for the reason that H constructively deserted and abandoned
her. H filed an answer denying constructive desertion; thereafter, on
April 1o, 1957 H filed a cross-bill seeking a divorce from W on the
ground that she deserted him on or about February 1,1957. On November 15, 1957 the cause was referred to a commissioner in chancery.
The commissioner heard the evidence and submitted his report on
July 17, 1958 in which he found that W was not entitled to a divorcethat the original bill would not lie; but that H, as cross-complainant,
was entitled to a divorce on the ground of wilful desertion and abandonment. The trial court confirmed the commissioner's finding that
W's original bill would not lie; but ruled further that H's cross-bill,
having been filed subsequently to W's original bill, must also fail. H
appealed from this trial decree.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of the lower
court holding that H's cross-bill failed because the grounds asserted
occurred after W filed her original bill. The court stated:
"Thus it is disclosed that the alleged desertion on the part
of the wife did not occur until after the filing of her suit and
before the merits of the same had been determined, and was
'5
insufficient in law to show wilful desertion and adandonment."
In view of the fact that W's original bill was without merit, this
would seem to be a rather broad statement of the law; yet the Virginia court was not without precedent.
would seem to be consonant with the principles of justice that every right and
every defense to which either of the parties was entitled at any time before the
date of the decree should be considered. Von Bernuth, 76 N.J. Eq. 487, 74 At. 7oo,
702 (19o9).
3
Plattner v. Plattner, 202 Va. 263, 117 S.E.2d 128 (196o); Smith v. Smith, 2o2
Va. 1o4, 116 S.E.2d 1o (ig6o); Hudgins v. Hudgins, 18i Va. 81, 23 S.E.2d 774
(1943); Craig v. Craig, xi8 Va. 284, 87 S.E. 727 (1916).
'202 Va. 263, 117 S.E.2d 128 (1960).
6Id. at 266, 117 S.E.2d at i3o. (Emphasis added.)
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A bare two months before Plattnerwas decided, the same Virginia
court, although considering slightly different facts, made an identical
statement of the law. In Smith v. Smith 6 the court ruled on these facts:
W, at the instance of H, left their marital home and took up residence with her parents. While she was thus separated from H, W filed
a suit against H for separate maintenance alleging cruelty, desertion
and wrongful refusal to support her. Among other pleadings, H filed
a cross-bill four months after W filed her suit alleging that W deserted him. The lower court held that W had failed to prove her
case, but that H was entitled to an absolute divorce from W on the
ground of desertion. W appealed from this decree.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held that H could not prevail on
this cross-bill, for the sole reason that W's alleged offense occurred subsequent to the filing of her suit; accordingly the trial court's decree was
reversed. "[T]he desertion relied on for divorce must be alleged and
proved to have occurred prior to the bringing of the suit, not based
upon some act or conduct alleged to have taken place during its pendency."7 The court stated that H in his cross-bill had alleged an
offense to have occurred while W's suit was pending and that such an
8
allegation "cannot serve him as a ground for divorce in this suit."
Again, the cross-bill was defeated, not on its merits, but by the fact
that a bill of complaint which had no merit was filed first.
The Virginia court in Plattner and Smzth seemed to be primarily
persuaded by the authority of an earlier Virginia case, Hudgins v.
Hudgins.9 Although the facts of the Hudgins case differ from those
of the later decisions, the doctrine laid down by the court supports
these decisions. In the earlier case the evidence was replete with
examples of gross and shameful conduct on the part of W for a number
of years preceding the suit. H filed a bill of complaint charging W
with cruelty and constructive desertion and seeking a divorce a mensa
et thorQ. W filed a cross-bill alleging that H deserted her by leaving
their home after he brought his suit. The trial court dismissed H's
suit and granted W a divorce on the ground of the alleged desertion
by H. The appellate court reversed this decree holding that the evidence compellingly showed that H was entitled to a divorce on his
original bill, and that W could not be granted relief on her cross-bill.
A final decree of divorce was granted to H.
12o2 Va. 104, ii6 S.E.2d iio (ig6o)
71d. at iog, i16 S.E.2d at 113.
8
1d at io, i16 S.E.2d at i14. (Emphasis added.)
Qi8i Va. 81, 23 S.E.2d 774 (i943).
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In ruling out W's cross-bill, the Hudgins court assigned the following reason:
"It seems well settled that the absenting of one spOuse from the
other after the institution and during the. pendency of a suit
for divorce, as here, is not desertion in law and is not an act
upon which a suit for desertion may be predicated. Indeed,
in many cases it is highly proper that such physical separation
should be, and under many circumstances it is, commendable."'10
Such physical separation was no doubt commendable in the Hudgins
case as W was shown to have been guilty of derelictions which would
have justified H's leaving the marital home. H's original bill was held
to have embodied a meritorious claim; his grievance was real. But
what of the Plattner and Smith decisions, each of which dealt with
a situation where the original bill had no merit? Is a spouse to be allowed to insulate himself against a divorce proceeding merely by
filing a suit which may or may not have merit? In view of the interminableperibds during which artful litigants may keep a case pending without securing a ruling on its merits, this latter question presents a perplexing problem.
The real issue would seem to be not whether the original suit
for divorce was actually determined in favor of the complainant, but
whether in fact the complainant was in good faith in bringing the
suit-whether there was sufficient evidence to give rise to a reasonable
belief by complainant that his cause had enough merit to entitle
him to a judicial determination of the same. If such evidence exists,
then the pendency of his suit is a bar to a cross-suit alleging his desertion during such pendency. "Where one spouse in good faith
brings proreedings for a divorce against the other though in fact,
as it may develop, there is no ground for divorce, it is the general
rule that there can be no desertion by the one of the other pending
the divorce proceedings, as it is presumed that no return would be
then permitted; and futhermore, the complaining spouse, by a return to matrimonial cohabitation, might be held to have condoned
the ground on which the proceeding for a divorce was based."'1
The pendency of a sham suit, therefore, would not constitute a
"OId. at 87, 23 S.E.2d at 777.
119 R.CJL. Divorce and Separation § 147 (1915). (Emphasis added.) See also
Easter v. Easter, 75 N.H. 270, 73 At. 30 (19o9) wherein it is stated that while
"the pendency of a libel for divorce is an evidentiary fact, bearing upon the question
whether the absence complained of is such an abandonment as the statute makes
a cause for divorce . one honestly prosecuting a supposedly sound suit for divorce cannot be found guilty of desertion while so engaged...."
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defense to a cross-suit alleging desertion of the defendant by the complainant, for there was in fact no justification for leaving. In the
New Jersey case of Von Bernuth v. Von Bernuth,'2 W filed suit against
H alleging cruelty and malicious acts by H. At the trial there was no
evidence to support W's allegations. W's leaving home subsequent
to the filing of her suit, therefore, was held to constitute actionable
desertion on her part. In another New Jersey case, Wezgel v. TVeigel,l :;
W filed a suit for divorce alleging cruelty; her suit was dismissed for
insufficient evidence. In a subsequent suit by H against AV, it was
alleged that W wrongfully deserted H by leaving the matrimonial
home during the pendency of her suit. H's contention was upheld, and
he was granted a divorce for the reason that W's original suit was not
in good faith. The New Jersey court stated that as a general rule
there can be no desertion by one spouse of the other during the pendency of a suit for divorce. "But in all the cases which state the proposition in general terms there is an assumption that the case which relieves from the duty of cohabitation during its pendency is one
brought in good faith.. . In such a case it is of no significance
whether the complainant succeeds or fails in the suit by which she
presents her claim. Her separation during its pendency is not obstinate, for the reason that there is a justifiable cause for it, and that
it is her right to have a judicial determination of what she believes to
be real grievance, unembarrassed by presumptions adverse to her
which would necessarily attend upon continued cohabitation with her
husband. When, however, it is shown that the wife's previous suit, the
pendency of which is set up to excuse her apparent desertion, was
based on allegations which were known by her to be false when they
were submitted to the court, and when her testimony in that suit in
support of those allegations is proven to have been untrue by many
disinterested witnesses .. the excusatory effect of the pendency of
4
the previous suit is wholly lost."'
The true test, then, would seem to be one of good faith as an
element of the original suit for divorce. If this element exists, then
desertion is a legal impossibility during the pendency of the suit.
If, however, it does not exist, the complainant leaves at his peril.
The purpose of this comment, then, is not to take exception to the
rulings of the Virginia court in Plattner and Smith, but to point out
the vague area of law in which these decisions lie. On the one hand,
'276 N.J. Eq. 487, 74 At. 700 (1909).
1363 N.J. Eq. 677, 52 At. 1123 (1902).
1Id. at 679, 52 At. at 1124.
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there are numerous decisions to the effect that any matrimonial offense
which may be alleged in an original bill of complaint may be the
subject of a cross-bill notwithstanding the fact that the offense alleged occurred after the original suit was filed.15 On the other hand,
there is abundant language to the effect that as a matter of law an
offense alleged in the cross-bill to have occurred subsequent to the
filing of the suit for divorce cannot constitute a ground for divorce. 16
Each such statement is needlessly broad. It is certainly true that a crosscomplainant may be granted relief on the ground of adultery committed by the original complainant pending the outcome of the
original suit. 1 7 The difficulty seems to arise only where desertion is
the ground alleged in the cross-bill. In this context is it a legal impossibility for desertion to occur during the pendency of a divorce
suit? It is submitted that on the authority of the Von Bernuth and
Weigel cases, the answer must be in the negative. There is nothing
magic about'the filing of a suit; if there exists no reasonable juitification for such complaint, then there is no legal excuse for the complainant's leaving his matrimonial home.

"5See note i supra.
"6Renner v. Renner, 177 Md. 689, 12 A.2d 195 (194o); Cnser v. Crser, tog W. Va.

696, 156 SE. 84 (193o) ; see also Virginia cases cited in this comment.
17Blanc v. Blanc, 67 Hun. (N.Y.) 384, 22 N.Y. Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Roberts
v. Roberts, 99 W. Va. 204, 128 SXE. 144 (1925).
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